Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to D A Henderson.
This article presents an overview of the nature and scope of the challenges posed by biological weapons, and offers ways by which the infectious diseases professional community might address the challenges of biological weapons and bioterrorism.
OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.
Of seven global eradication programs this century, only two have relied primarily on vaccines for control measures - those against smallpox and poliomyelitis. Smallpox is history and polio could possibly achieve a similar status within the next decade. The hallmarks of these successful programs were surveillance and community outreach and involvement. However, a research agenda, so crucial to smallpox eradication, has largely been ignored or dismissed by polio program managers. This could prove to be a serious, even fatal error.
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OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of smallpox as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. Evidence The first author (D.A.H.) conducted a literature search in conjunction with the preparation of another publication on smallpox as well as this article. The literature identified was reviewed and opinions were sought from experts in the diagnosis and management of smallpox, including members of the working group. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments that were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on October 30, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: Specific recommendations are made regarding smallpox vaccination, therapy, postexposure isolation and infection control, hospital epidemiology and infection control, home care, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs. In the event of an actual release of smallpox and subsequent epidemic, early detection, isolation of infected individuals, surveillance of contacts, and a focused selective vaccination program will be the essential items of an effective control program.
OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of anthrax as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to April 1998, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of references identified by this search led to identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments which were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on June 12, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: Specific consensus recommendations are made regarding the diagnosis of anthrax, indications for vaccination, therapy for those exposed, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs.
Biological weapons have recently attracted the attention and the resources of the nation. Discerning the nature of the threat of bioweapons as well as appropriate responses to them requires greater attention to the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. The dominant paradigm of a weapon as a nuclear device that explodes or a chemical cloud that is set adrift leaves us ill-equipped conceptually and practically to assess and thus to prevent the potentially devastating effects of bioterrorism. Strengthening the public health and infectious disease infrastructure is an effective step toward averting the suffering that could be wrought by a terrorist's use of a biological agent.
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The declaration in 1980 that smallpox had been eradicated reawakened interest in disease eradication as a public health strategy. The smallpox programme's success derived, in part, from lessons learned from the preceding costly failure of the malaria eradication campaign. In turn, the smallpox programme offered important lessons with respect to other prospective disease control programmes, and these have been effectively applied in the two current global eradication initiatives, those against poliomyelitis and dracunculiasis. Taking this theme a step further, there are those who would now focus on the development of an inventory of diseases which might, one by one, be targeted either for eradication or elimination. This approach, while interesting, fails to recognize many of the important lessons learned and their broad implications for contemporary disease control programmes worldwide.
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We reported that the Os mutation in ROP mice induced a 50% reduction in nephron number, glomerular hypertrophy, and severe glomerulosclerosis. We examined two mouse strains with the Os mutation, ROP Os/+ and C57 Os/+ mice, to determine whether the genetic background influenced the development of glomerulosclerosis. Nephron number was decreased by 50% in both ROP Os/+ and C57 Os/+ mice, and a glomerular volume and labeling index were two- to threefold increased in both. Whereas glomerulosclerosis was severe in ROP Os/+ mice, it was absent or minimal in C57 Os/+ mice. ROP Os/+ glomeruli had two- to threefold more type IV collagen, laminin, and tenascin than C57 Os/+ by immunofluorescence microscopy. Glomerular alpha 1IV collagen and tenascin mRNA levels were increased (2.8- and 1.7-fold) in ROP Os/+ and in C57 Os/+ (1.7- and 1.4-fold) mice. Both ROP Os/+ and C57 Os/+ mice had a slight increase (1.5- and 1.7-fold) in 72-kD collagenase mRNA levels. Whereas laminin B1 mRNA levels were twofold higher in ROP +/+ than in C57 +/+ mice, there was no further change in the presence of the Os mutation. Thus, the response to the Os mutation depended on the mouse strain, since severe glomerulosclerosis occurred only in ROP Os/+ mice, even though cell proliferation and glomerular hypertrophy also were present in C57 Os/+ mice.
The strategy currently used to control measles in most countries has been to immunize each successive birth cohort through the routine health services delivery system. While measles vaccine coverage has increased markedly, significant measles outbreaks have continued to recur. During the past 5 years, experience in the Americas suggests that measles transmission has been interrupted in a number of countries (Cuba, Chile, and countries in the English-speaking Caribbean and successfully controlled in all remaining countries. Since 1991 these countries have implemented one-time "catch-up" vaccination campaigns (conducted during a short period, usually 1 week to 1 month, and targeting all children 9 months through 14 years of age, regardless of previous vaccination status or measles disease history). These campaigns have been followed by improvements in routine vaccination services and in surveillance systems, so that the progress of the measles elimination efforts can be sustained and monitored. Follow-up mass vaccination campaigns for children younger than 5 years are planned to take place every 3 to 5 years.
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