What information should physicians be required to know?
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to C M Culver.
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In his article 'Specifying, balancing and interpreting bioethical principles' (Richardson, 2000), Henry Richardson claims that the two dominant theories in bioethics--principlism, put forward by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Bioethics, and common morality, put forward by Gert, Culver and Clouser in Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals--are deficient because they employ balancing rather than specification to resolve disputes between principles or rules. We show that, contrary to Richardson's claim, the major problem with principlism, either the original version or the specified principlism of Richardson, is that it conceives of morality as being composed of free-standing principles, rather than as common morality conceives it, as being a complete public system, composed of rules, ideals, morally relevant features, and a procedure for determining when a rule can be justifiably violated.
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There is significant confusion about the topic of advance directives (ADs), stimulated by the increasing realization that the current AD instruments probably have little salutary clinical effect. The instruments themselves are almost certainly part of the problem. In most cases they are too simple and narrowly focused, and one, the Medical Directive, is pointlessly complex. Seven suggestions are proposed for creating more adequate AD forms. The American Medical Association's recent report on ADs is disappointingly superficial and does not usefully diagnose or suggest solutions for the problems in this area of clinical practice.
The whole-body and hand radiation doses to our technical staff were retrospectively compared for three distinct 4-mo periods when either 201TI or 99mTc-sestamibi were exclusively used for stress myocardial perfusion imaging. During the initial 4-mo period when 99mTc-sestamibi replaced 201TI, the mean whole-body film badge readings increased from 100 to 450 microSv/mo (p < 0.001) for nuclear medicine technologists (n = 10) and from 240 to 560 microSv/mo (p < 0.05) for radiopharmacy technologists (n = 2). Mean TLD readings to the hands also increased, although the differences were not statistically significant for the nuclear medicine technologists. Noninvasive cardiology staff were monitored with film badges and the mean whole-body film badge reading, when 99mTc-sestamibi was the imaging agent, was 360 microSv per month. Radiation reduction methods that decreased radiation exposure to staff were utilized. The most effective included the use of a lead face shield and lead lined storage container in the noninvasive imaging area, handling spills by shielding instead of decontamination and methods to reduce time spent in close proximity to the patient.
The term 'manipulation' is frequently employed but rarely discussed or defined in psychiatric circles. This paper reviews previous conceptual analyses of the term by philosophers and psychiatrists, and examines its use in ordinary discourse. A series of characteristics which comprise the conceptual core of the term when it is unambiguously applied in interpersonal settings are proposed. Manipulation is contrasted with other behavior control methods such as rational persuasion and coercion, with emphasis on the role played by deception and the communicative context in which the manipulative transaction occurs. It is argued that manipulative behavior is fundamentally intentional, and the usefulness of the concept of 'unconscious manipulation' is questioned. Though the proposal that Manipulative Personality Disorder be formally recognized as a new diagnostic category is rejected, it is urged that the concept of manipulation receive wider attention and discussion within the mental health community.
The purpose of this study was to develop guidelines based on direct patient measurements as to when 131I-treated thyroid cancer patients may resume close personal contact after release from the hospital. External exposure rates were measured on 27 patients using a calibrated ionization survey meter. The patients' exposure rates were measured at the time of release from the hospital and 2-7 days post-hospital discharge. Measurements were taken at 1, 0.6 and 0.3 meters from the patient's upright body axis (stomach to thyroid). Vertical movement of the survey instrument was utilized to obtain the maximum reading each time. All patients had exposure rates less than 2 mR/hr at 1 meter at 2-4 days post-hospital discharge. Eight-eight percent (21/24) had exposure rates less than 2 mR/hr at 0.6 meter at 2-4 days post-hospital discharge. Guidelines can be prepared specifically for thyroid cancer therapy patients that are rational and consistent with existing radiologic health standards.
The purpose of this study was to develop guidelines based on patient measurements as to when iodine-131- (131I) treated hyperthyroid patients may resume close personal contact. External exposure rates were measured on 59 patients using an ionization survey meter in the upright position. The initial measurement was recorded within 20 min post-dose administration at one meter. Exposure rates were measured 2-11 days post-dose administration at 1, 0.6, and 0.3 meters from the patient's thyroid. In the administered dose range of 3 to less than 12 mCi of 131I, all 40 patients measured less than or equal to 2.0 mR/hr at one meter on Day 0, and 25 patients (25/29) were less than or equal to 2.0 mR/hr at 0.6 meter on Days 2-4. Guidelines can be prepared based on the administered dose that are rational and in conformity with existing radiologic health standards.
Patients' competence to make medical decisions, analysts frequently hold, is the key concept for determining whether those decisions may be overruled. Competence, however, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for concluding when it is morally admissible to supersede refusals of treatment. People may be able to reach kinds of decisions involving immediate medical consequences, but not ones entailing long-term outcomes. Open recognition of the limited but important exceptions to the principle of never overruling competent patients' refusal of care would better preserve their autonomy than unduly accepting the absoluteness of the principle.
Ethics committees at small hospitals confront most of the same ethical dilemmas present at large hospitals, but must usually deal with them with fewer resources and less access to recognized expertise. Nonetheless small hospital committees can function effectively in the areas of education, policy deliberation, and case consultation. The development of ethics committees at two small Vermont hospitals is described, noting some of the problems associated with smallness and making suggestions about how to surmount them.
This article presents an outline of a general moral theory and shows its relationship to the concepts of paternalism and that of valid consent and refusal. The authors then show how this theory and these concepts can be usefully applied to the moral problems that neurologists often face in determining how to act when they have distressing information for their patients. Finally, a procedure is provided for determining when it is morally justified to deceive patients by withholding information about their diagnoses, prognoses, or about their prospective treatments.
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The standard ways of distinguishing between active and passive euthanasia, act versus omission, and removal of ordinary versus removal of extraordinary care, do not have any clear moral significance. We have used particular aspects of the physician-patient relationship to make a morally significant distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Passive euthanasia is defined as the physician's abiding by the rational valid refusal of life-sustaining treatment of a patient or his surrogate decision-maker. Understanding passive euthanasia in this way makes it clear why, everything else being equal, there is no morally significant difference between discontinuing a treatment and not starting it, for example, taking a patient off a respirator versus not putting him on in the first place. It also makes clear why stopping the feeding and hydration of some patients is not merely morally permissible but is morally required. Patients may make a rational valid refusal of food and fluids just as they may of other kinds of life support, and what patients rationally refuse when competent holds its force when they become incompetent. By basing the distinction between active and passive euthanasia on the universally recognized moral force of a rational valid refusal, we have provided a clear foundation for the moral significance of this distinction. Our way of making the distinction preserves for patients the control over their lives that has sometimes been unjustifiably taken from them. It also eases the burden on doctors who no longer are forced to make use of ad hoc and confused distinctions in which they justifiably have little faith.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
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