Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to A Rupp.
This paper examines the receipt of exemptions from Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for distinct part psychiatric units of general hospitals. A logit model of the exemption status of 1,045 psychiatric units is estimated using 1984 data. The results suggest that units that were expected to profit from a change in payment method (cost based on PPS) were least likely to obtain an exemption from PPS.
The authors present data on changes in resource use by Medicare psychiatric patients in general hospitals after the introduction of the prospective payment system in 1984. Length of stay and charges per discharge during fiscal year 1984 fell 13.8% and 15.9%, respectively, after the new system began, even though 31.8% of the discharges for Medicare psychiatric cases were from exempt psychiatric units. The decrease in length of stay was considerably larger (23.2%) in hospitals with no psychiatric units, which were not exempt from prospective payment.
In this paper, we study the effects on psychiatry of Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) during 1984, as PPS was implemented. We examined data on psychiatric discharges before and after PPS from three kinds of hospitals--those with psychiatric units exempt from PPS, those with nonexempt units, and those that treated psychiatric patients in scatter beds--as well as data on all hospital discharges. We conclude that the providers of psychiatric services responded to the incentives inherent in PPS much the way hospitals as a whole did--with significantly reduced lengths of stay. Of the three kinds of hospitals that rendered psychiatric care, those that treated patients in scatter beds had the greatest reduction in length of stay. Using readmission rates as a gross indicator of quality, we conclude that quality did not suffer because of the shortened stays.
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Analysis of the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey indicates that the poor/near-poor with continuous Medicaid coverage had almost double the probability of use of ambulatory mental health care compared with the poor/near-poor not enrolled in Medicaid. The higher probability of use reflects the impact of increased financial accessibility to needed mental health services and may also be influenced by an associated demand for social services provided by organized mental health settings in addition to clinical services. Intensity of use per user was not significantly different between Medicaid- and non-Medicaid-enrolled poor/near-poor, but the percent paid out of pocket was substantially lower for those continuously in Medicaid.
Comparison with administrative records or "best estimate file" enables an evaluation of the accuracy of household reports of mental health use in the four-State Medicaid Household Survey conducted as part of the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey. Underreporting of probability of ambulatory mental health use ranged from 14 to 24% compared to 5 to 7% for ambulatory health visits; household estimates of number of mental health visits seemed to be more accurate than administrative records. Household reporting of provider type seemed to be very accurate for psychiatrist visits, but there seemed to be a tendency to report psychologist visits as psychiatrist visits.
The simultaneous operation of per case and per service payment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency used in setting per case rates, allows a comparison of the effects of differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper presents such a comparison with 1977-1981 data. Regressions performed on cost-per-case and total cost data indicate that costs were lower only when per case payment limits were very stringent. Positive net revenue incentives appeared to be insufficient to induce a reduction in length of stay or ancillary services use. These changes in medical practice patterns thus appear more likely under the threat of financial losses--that is, under the threat of the stick rather than the inducement of the carrot.
We examined the extent to which inpatient care for patients with mental disorders in general, acute care hospitals responds differently to two types of prospective hospital payment. In Maryland, hospitals have been regulated since 1976 under two forms of payment based on per-service and per-case definitions of hospital output. The study utilizes a 20% sample of 58,000 mental-disorder discharges from 21 per-case- and 24 per-service-reimbursed hospitals in Maryland between fiscal years 1977 and 1980. The effects of payment method on length of stay are examined through the application of multivariate regression models. The empirical results are generally consistent with the notion that the per-case payment method provides some incentives for hospitals to reduce the length of stay. The regulatory effects, however, vary with patient characteristics, particularly by diagnosis.
The authors report on a study of the impact of a prospective payment method on hospital charges and mix of services provided to a group of Medicare patients treated for mental disorders in general acute care hospitals in Maryland. The study focused on per case reimbursement, under which hospitals are guaranteed a level of total revenue based on the number and case mix of discharges, and examined its effect on hospital charges during an index admission and on hospital and non-hospital charges over a three-month period following the index admission. The results suggest that per case reimbursement provides incentives to reduce the cost of one hospital stay, but this cost reduction is possibly offset by a higher readmission rate or by higher readmission charges. The authors conclude that the impact of the per case payment method on the total cost of mental health care over a specific period of time is insignificant, but that the payment method may influence the pattern of care.
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